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This paper examines revealed parent preferences for their children's education using a unique
data set that includes the number of parent requests for individual elementary school teachers
along with information on teacher attributes including principal reports of teacher characteristics
that are typically unobservable.  We find that, on average, parents strongly prefer teachers that
principals describe as good at promoting student satisfaction and place relatively less value on a
teacher's ability to raise standardized math or reading achievement.  These aggregate effects,
however, mask striking differences across family demographics.  Families in higher poverty
schools strongly value student achievement and are essentially indifferent to the principal's report
of a teacher's ability to promote student satisfaction.  The results are reversed for families in
higher-income schools.
Brian A. Jacob













I.  Introduction 
 
This paper examines parent preferences for their child’s elementary school teacher using 
information obtained from principals about parent requests for individual teachers.  To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine the preferences of parents using information on 
choices within schools.  This allows us to not only control for location and other factors that may 
be driving residential or school choice, but also allows us to explore extremely detailed teacher 
characteristics.  In addition to standard teacher demographics such as gender, experience, 
certification status and educational background, we use achievement data to create a value-added 
measure of each teacher’s ability to raise student performance.  Moreover, we utilize principal 
survey information to create teacher measures that reflect “softer” teacher attributes that are 
likely to be valued by parents but are typically unobservable to the researcher (e.g., whether the 
teacher is adept at classroom management or is perceived as a good role model for students). 
We find that, on average, parents strongly prefer teachers that principals describe as best 
able to promote student satisfaction, and place relatively less value on a teacher’s ability to raise 
standardized math or reading achievement.  These aggregate effects, however, mask striking 
differences across family demographics.  Parents in low-income and minority schools strongly 
value student achievement and are essentially indifferent to the principal’s report of a teacher’s 
ability to promote student satisfaction.  The results are reversed for families in higher-income 
and non-minority schools.  These results are consistent with a declining marginal utility of basic 
math and reading achievement.   Moreover, we find that parents in low-income and minority 
schools are substantially less likely to request any teacher.    2 
Several factors are important to note when interpreting our results.  First, our estimates 
reflect parent decisions conditional on school choice.
1  It is possible that parents may consider 
certain factors in choosing a school and other factors in choosing a teacher within a school.  
Recent research suggests that the variation in teacher quality within schools is much larger than 
the variation in teacher quality across schools (Hanushek et al. 2005).  To the extent that parents 
recognize this fact, they may well prioritize factors such as proximity to home in choosing a 
school, but focus on student achievement in requesting a teacher.    
Second, the parameters we estimate reflect both what parents observe and what they 
value.  To the extent that parents have less information on a particular teacher characteristic, our 
estimates may understate parent preferences for this characteristic.
2  In particular, one might be 
concerned that parents do not have good information on teachers’ ability to raise student 
achievement.  Parents may have limited access to student test scores by classroom, and even with 
such information they may have difficulty inferring teacher quality due to non-random 
assignment of students.  In practice, however, several pieces of evidence suggest that parents in 
this district are able to observe teacher behaviors and attributes associated with student 
achievement gains.  Most notably, those parents who arguably have the least ability to ascertain a 
teacher’s ability to improve student performance – i.e., parents in low-income, high minority 
schools – exhibit the strongest preferences for teachers with this quality.
3  In addition, this 
pattern is evident regardless of whether one uses a principal-reported measure or a teacher value-
                                                 
1 There is no open enrollment system in this district so that residential location entirely determines elementary 
school attendance.  
2 This does not imply, however, that the parent must observe the actual variable we include in our regressions in 
order to infer preferences.  For example, principal ratings are not observed by the parent but likely reflect the same 
teacher attributes and behaviors that parents learn about through informal channels.  In this case, a significant 
coefficient on the principal rating suggests that both parents and principals have access to correlated information 
regarding teacher effectiveness. 
3 Of course, one can imagine some circumstances in which parents from wealthier schools are less able to observe 
teacher quality (e.g., if the variation in teacher quality is smaller in such schools).  We explore these alternatives in 
greater detail below. 3 
added measure based on student achievement scores.  Indeed, the results are even stronger for 
the principal-reported measure, which is likely to reflect teacher behaviors and attributes that are 
more easily observable to parents.    
Third, the analysis is based on aggregate teacher request data.  This limits our ability to 
distinguish between the following two cases: (a) parents whose children attend low-income 
schools have different preferences than parents whose children attend higher-income schools; 
and (b) low-income parents themselves (regardless the school their children attend) have 
different preferences than higher-income parents.  To the extent that many educational decisions 
are made on the basis of school-level characteristics, however, this limitation is less important 
from a policy perspective.  Finally, because parents are not required to request a teacher, our 
estimates reflect the preferences of the roughly 30 percent of parents who make a request.
4  
While it is of course impossible to know with certainty the preferences of those parents who 
made no request, our estimates will reflect the preferences of a particularly interesting and 
important group – i.e., those parents who are most involved in their children’s education, and 
most likely to be involved in the political process and impact school policy.   
Our findings suggest that what parents expect out of school is likely to depend on parent 
preferences and family background.  To the extent that a child has already learned to read well 
by the second or third grade, for example, basic phonics instruction may be unappreciated by the 
parent.  On the other hand, the parents of a disadvantaged child who is still struggling with basic 
literacy are likely to value the emphasis on basic skills.  This implies that more and less 
advantaged parents may exhibit systematic differences with regards to schooling preferences 
even if both sets of parents have the same underlying utility functions. 
                                                 
4 Moreover, to the extent that many parents do not have a strong preference for any particular teacher, but want their 
children to be in the same classroom, certain teachers preferred by a small number of parents may become focal 
points.  In this case, our estimates may reflect the preferences of a smaller subset of parents. 4 
  This has important implications for current school reform strategies.  First, it suggests 
that communities are likely to react quite differently to accountability policies, such as those 
embodied in the federal accountability legislation No Child Left Behind (NCLB), depending on 
the demographic makeup of the children.  Specifically, we would predict that higher-income 
communities would express greater dissatisfaction with the achievement emphasis of NCLB.   
Second, it suggests that school choice could lead to segregation across demographic groups 
driven by the preferences of the parents.  At the same time, however, our findings imply that 
low-income families who make a request not only recognize high quality teachers, but also 
strongly value student achievement.  This may alleviate the concerns of some that more 
disadvantaged students will not benefit from choice.   
While our results cannot be directly compared with the findings from studies that 
examine parental choice of schools, our findings suggest that even the best school choice studies 
may be more difficult to interpret than previously realized.  For example, the preference for 
attending racial or socially homogeneous schools that has been documented in prior literature 
may not reflect a desire for segregation per se, but instead may reflect an interest in a particular 
type of curriculum or pedagogy with the socioeconomic composition of the school merely 
serving as a signal of certain practices.  For example, low-income families may choose to attend 
a school with a high proportion of other low-income families because they believe that the 
parents in these schools have preferences that, like their own, prioritize student achievement over 
student enjoyment.  Conversely, high-income parents may choose to attend schools with high 
test scores not because those schools engage in the basic skills and test preparation that is most 
helpful for increasing test performance, but for completely opposite reasons – namely, because 
the preferences of families in those schools signal that teachers will engage in less basic skills 5 
instruction and offer instead a broad curriculum and activities that increase student engagement 
in the academic process.       
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II, we briefly review the prior 
literature on parent preferences in education.  In Section III, we describe our data.  In Section IV, 
we present some preliminary reduced form estimates of the association between teacher 
characteristics and parent requests.  In Section V, we develop a simple model of parent requests 
which we estimate via maximum likelihood to recover the underlying preference parameters of 
parents.  Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Prior Literature 
The prior research on parent preferences falls into several categories.   Most prior studies 
rely on surveys that directly ask parents what features they value in a school (see, for example, 
Lee, Croninger and Smith 1994 and Coldren and Boulton 1991).  They find that parents, 
including lower-income respondents, highly value academic quality.  The two major drawbacks 
of these studies are (1) parents may provide socially desirable responses, and (2) surveys do not 
present parents with realistic choices that require them to make tradeoffs between specific 
characteristics.    
A second category of studies examines the actual choices made by parents.  In general, 
these studies indicate that the location and racial/socioeconomic composition of a school are the 
most important factors for parents.  For example, Glazerman (1998) utilized an extremely rich 
data set to estimate a discrete choice model of parent preferences in the Minneapolis public 
school choice program.  He found that parents were not more likely to choose schools with high 6 
test scores or greater value-added, but instead preferred schools relatively close to home and 
ones where they were better represented ethnically and racially.
5   
  Other studies examine the relationship between housing prices and school characteristics 
to assess how much parents value different aspects of schooling.   In a seminal paper, Black 
(1999) examined house prices close to school attendance boundaries within school districts, 
thereby removing the influence of neighborhoods, taxes and school spending and focusing 
strictly on individual school characteristics.  She found that parents were willing to pay 2.5 
percent more for a five percent increase in student test scores.  Similarly, Figlio and Lucas 
(2004) find that arbitrary distinctions embedded in the letter grades that schools receive on state 
“report cards” lead to major housing price effects, even after one accounts for underlying school 
achievement and other characteristics.  Bayer et al. (2003) develop a comprehensive structural 
model for identifying preferences for school and neighborhood attributes, and estimate the model 
using detailed data from a restricted-use version of the Census.  They find that on average 
households are willing to pay an additional one percent for homes – substantially lower than in 
prior work – when the average performance of the local school is increased by five percent.  
While these studies provide an idea of what parents value in their children’s education, they do 
not allow one to separately identify which characteristics of schools are valued by parents since 
test scores, socioeconomic composition and other factors are very highly correlated.   
Finally, several studies approach the question of parental preferences by comparing 
schools and students in areas with more or less opportunities for Tiebout choice.  Hoxby (1999) 
finds that schools in MSAs with more choice offer more challenging curricula, impose stricter 
academic requirements and have more structured and discipline-oriented environments, 
                                                 
5 For other examples, see Henig 1990, Lankford and Wyckoff 2000, Weiher and Tedin 2002, Schneider and Buckley 
2002.    7 
suggesting that parents value these characteristics in schools.  Rothstein (2003) explores parental 
preferences by examining how the within MSA residential location of families differs across 
metropolitan areas, and finds little evidence that parents choose schools for characteristics other 
than peer groups.   
 
III. Data 
The data for this study come from a mid-size school district located in the western United 
States.
6  While the students in the district are predominantly white (73 percent), there is a 
reasonable degree of heterogeneity in terms of ethnicity and socioeconomic status.   Latino 
students comprise 21 percent of the elementary population and nearly half of all students in the 
district (48 percent) receive free or reduced price lunch.  Achievement levels in the district are 
almost exactly at the average of the nation (49
th percentile on the Stanford Achievement Test).    
With the assistance of the district, we were able to collect parental requests for specific 
elementary school teachers during the 2003-04 and 2004-05 school years.  Unfortunately, the 
data on individual students or families was not available in most cases, so our analysis is limited 
to aggregate request data (e.g., 15 parents requested Mrs. Smith, 5 parents requested Mr. 
Williams, etc.)
 7  We discuss the implications of this data limitation in Section IV, using 
individual request data we obtained from several schools to examine what type(s) of parents in a 
school make requests.   
We link these parental requests to administrative files that include a variety of teacher 
characteristics such as age, experience, educational attainment, undergraduate and graduate 
                                                 
6 The district has requested to remain anonymous.   
7 Data on parent requests is not maintained centrally by the school district.  We obtained paper records from 
individual schools and, with the assistance of school administrators, matched the data to individual teachers, for 
whom demographic information was available on centralized records.  8 
institution attended, and license and certification information.  We also link this data to student 
achievement and demographic information which allows us to create value-added measures of 
teacher effectiveness.  Finally, we administered a survey to principals in February 2003 in which 
we asked them to evaluate their teachers on a variety of dimensions, providing additional 
information about the teachers.   
We obtained parent request information for all kindergarten to sixth grade teachers in 11 
of the 13 elementary schools in the district in 2003-04 and 2004-05.
8  Note that this also includes 
a list of all teachers who received zero requests.  While we have request information for 
kindergarten and first grade teachers, we exclude these from our main analyses since we do not 
have value-added or principal-report measures for these teachers.  Our final sample thus consists 
of 251 teachers.
9  
The top panel of Table I presents summary statistics for the final sample.   Only 14 
percent of teachers in our sample are men.  The average teacher is 44 years old and has roughly 
12 years of experience teaching.  The vast majority of teachers attended the main local 
university, while 14 percent attended another instate college and 4 percent attended a school out 
of state.  16 percent of teachers have a MA degree or higher, and the vast majority of teachers are 
licensed in either early childhood education or elementary education.  Finally, 10 percent of the 
teachers in our sample taught in a mixed-grade classroom and 3 percent were in a “split” 
classroom with another teacher.   
 
                                                 
8 More specifically, we have information for 11 of 13 schools for at least one of the two years, 2003-04 and 2004-
05.  We have request information from 6 of 13 elementary schools for the 2003-04 academic year and from 10 of 13 
elementary schools for the 2004-05 academic year.  Parent request data was not available in several schools because 
teacher requests were not accepted, principals failed to keep a record of such requests, or principals were 
uncomfortable participating in the research project (this was the case in only 1 of the 13 schools). 
9 We will refer to each school-classroom-year observation as a “teacher” although in a small number of cases there 
were two teachers in the classroom, in which case we use the average characteristics of the teachers. 9 
Parent Requests 
There is no formal procedure for parent requests in the district.  Principals report that they 
assign students to classes with an eye toward balancing race, gender and ability across 
classrooms within the same grade.  Parents submit requests during the spring or summer and 
principals make assignments over the summer.  During our analysis period, roughly 30 percent 
of parents requested a teacher each year and 84 percent of teachers received at least one parental 
request.  Parents are also able to request that that their child not be placed with a particular 
teacher, which we refer to as a negative request.  Only about 14 percent of teachers received any 
negative requests, and nearly all teachers with negative requests have at least one positive 
request as well.  Principals report that they are generally able to honor almost all requests and, 
perhaps for this reason, parents have an incentive to truthfully reveal their first preference. 
Parents in the district appear to have strong and varied preferences for teachers based on 
request data.  Figure I shows the distribution of positive requests.  Among those teachers 
receiving at least one request, the average number of requests was 8.  The interquartile range of 
requests is 7, ranging from the 25
th percentile of 3 requests to the 75
th percentile of 10 requests.   
While these results suggest that parents have strong preferences for particular teachers, 
they might also reflect differences in request policies across schools and grades.  To explore this 
possibility, Figure II plots the distribution of the difference between the most requested and least 
requested teacher in each school-grade-year combination.  The median difference is 10 and the 
90
th percentile is extremely large at 19.  Even in the 25
th percentile, the difference is still 5. 
Parent requests also appear to be quite persistent over time, suggesting that they capture 
some true teacher characteristic as opposed to simply fads or changing parent preferences.  
Figure III illustrates the correlation between requests in 2003-04 and 2004-05.  Instead of using 10 
the number of requests, we instead use a teacher’s rank within each school-year (i.e., the most 
requested teacher receives a 1, the second most requested receives a 2, etc.) to account for any 
changes in request policies over time.  The correlation is 0.66 and is strongly significant, 
suggesting that parents observe something that makes them request the same teachers year after 
year.
10 
Since our analysis will reflect the information and preferences only of those parents who 
make requests, it is useful to examine the characteristics of these families.  To do so, we regress 
the fraction of parents making a positive request in a particular school-year-grade on various 
characteristics of the student population.  Table II shows the results of these estimates.  As 
expected, we see that requests are negatively related to the poverty level and minority 
concentration.  The estimates in column 3, for example, imply that a ten percentage point 
increase in the percent of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch in the grade is 
associated with 5.2 percentage point fewer parents making a request.
11  These results suggest that 
the non-financial cost of making a request is higher for parents in low-income, more highly 
minority schools.  This may be due to language barriers, cultural differences, or information 
asymmetries.   
 
Principal Evaluations 
To obtain subjective performance assessments, we administered a survey to all 
elementary school principals in February 2003 asking them to evaluate their teachers along a 
variety of dimensions, including dedication and work ethic, classroom management, parent 
                                                 
10 Figure III is based on the sample of five schools for which we have request data in both 2003 and 2004. 
11 Other findings not shown in Table II include: (1) Conditional on student demographics, lagged student ability 
does not predict parental requests; (2) There is no interaction between student demographics and grade level; (3) All 
of the results in Table II are robust to a specifications where the dependent variable is the log-odds of parent 
requests (i.e., ln(p/1-p)).  All of these results are available from the authors upon request. 11 
satisfaction, positive relationship with administrators and ability to raise math and reading 
achievement (see Appendix A for a sample survey form).
12  Principals were assured that their 
responses would be completely confidential and would not be revealed to the teachers or to any 
other school district employee.  
The bottom panel of Table I shows the summary statistics of each rating.  With an 
average rating of roughly 8 on a scale of 1 to 10, it is clear that even these informal and 
confidential evaluations are quite lenient.  At the same time, Figure IV shows that principal 
ratings within each school are approximately normally distributed between 6 and 10 around a 
mean of 8, suggesting that the ratings do have considerable variation.  While the individual item 
ratings are certainly correlated, many of the correlations are far lower than one, suggesting that 
the individual items likely reflect multiple teacher attributes (Table A1 shows the full correlation 
matrix).  To investigate the possibility of several underlying constructs, we conducted an 
exploratory factor analysis.  Because the principal evaluation of parent satisfaction may be 
highly correlated with the parent request measure, we exclude this item from the factor 
analysis.
13   
Table III shows the loadings for the three factors produced by this factor analysis.  The 
first factor clearly measures student satisfaction, with high loadings on principal ratings of 
student satisfaction and teacher as role model.  The second factor appears to capture what might 
be described as traditional “teaching ability,” with high loadings on classroom management, 
                                                 
12 In this district, principals conduct formal evaluations annually for new teachers and every third year for tenured 
teachers.  However, prior studies have found such formal evaluations suffer from considerable compression with 
nearly all teachers being rated very highly.  These evaluations are also part of a teacher’s personnel file and it was 
not possible to obtain access to these without permission of the teachers. 
13 These factors were derived from a Maximum Likelihood factor analysis method limited to three factors with a 
Promax rotation. As an additional check, we create a second set of principal measures that are purged of the parent 
satisfaction information by regressing the factors created above on the parental satisfaction item.  We then use the 
residuals from these regressions as factors that are by construction orthogonal to the principal’s view of parent 
satisfaction.  The results, shown in Table IX, are comparable.  12 
organization and ability to influence student math and reading scores.  The third factor captures a 
teacher’s collegiality, with high loadings on the items that ask principals to assess the teacher’s 
relationship with colleagues and administrators.   
 
Student Achievement Measures of Teacher Effectiveness 
In this district, elementary students take a set of “Core” exams in reading and math in 
grades 1 to 8.
14  These multiple-choice criterion-referenced exams cover topics that are closely 
linked to the district learning objectives and goals.  While student achievement results have not 
been directly linked to rewards or sanctions until recently, the results of the Core exams are 
distributed to parents and published annually and both teachers and principals pay considerable 
attention to the scores.   
In order to capture a teacher’s effectiveness, we create value-added measures of each 
teacher’s contribution to student performance.  Here we present a brief discussion of these 
measures.  Appendix B provides a more detailed discussion of related identification and 
estimation issues.   
The primary challenge in constructing consistent estimates of teacher effectiveness using 
student achievement data is that students are generally not randomly assigned to classes.  
Following the standard practice in this literature, we estimate value-added models that control for 
a wide variety of observable student and classroom characteristics including prior achievement 
measures and, in some specifications, student fixed effects (see, for example, Aaronson et al. 
2004, Rockoff 2004, Hanushek et al. 2005).  Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
(1)  ijkt jt it t k j jt ijkt y C X y f d a e = B+ G+ + + + +  
                                                 
14 Students in select grades have recently begun to take a science exam as well. The district also administered the 
Stanford Achievement Test (a national, norm-referenced exam) to students in grades three, five and eight over this 
period. 13 
where i indexes students, j indexes teachers, k indexes school, and t indexes year.  The outcome 
measure, y , is a student’s score on a math or reading exam.  The scores are reported as the 
percentage of items the student answered correctly, which we normalize to be mean zero and 
with a standard deviation of one within each year and grade.   
The vector X consists of the following student characteristics: age, race, gender, free-
lunch eligibility, special education placement, limited English proficiency status, prior math 
achievement, prior reading achievement, and grade fixed effects.  C is a vector of classroom 
measures that include indicators for class size and average student characteristics.   t y  and  k f  are 
a set of year and school fixed effects respectively.  Teacher j’s contribution to student 
performance is captured by the  ' j s d .   jt a  is an error term that is common to all students in 
teacher j’s classroom in period t (e.g., adverse testing conditions faced by all students in a 
particular class such as a barking dog).   ijkt e is an error term that takes into account the student’s 
idiosyncratic error.  In order to properly account for the error structure described above, we 
estimate specification (1) using OLS and then correct the standard errors for correlation within 
teacher*year using the method suggested by Moulton (1990).
15  
All of the results presented in this paper are robust to a variety of alternative 
specifications of equation (1).  Perhaps most importantly, value-added models that include 
student fixed effects and time-varying measures of teacher experience yield comparable results 
(see Appendix B).  The fact that we obtain nearly identical results using value-added measures 
that incorporate student fixed effects provides additional reassurance that our measures provide 
                                                 
15 Another possibility would be to use cluster-corrected standard errors.  However, such standard errors cannot be 
computed for teachers that appear in the sample for a single year.  Additionally, the estimated standard errors can 
behave very poorly for teachers that are in the sample for a small number of years.  14 
consistent estimates of teacher performance.
16  Similarly, we obtain comparable results if we use 
a normalized gain score to account for the fact that it may be easier to make achievement gains at 
different points in the ability distribution.
17 
A second concern is that because our value-added measures will be estimated with error 
they will suffer from attenuation bias when used as independent variables in a regression.  To 
obtain consistent estimates of teacher value-added, we construct empirical Bayes (EB) estimates 
of teacher quality which we use in the analysis instead of the estimated value-added measures.  
This approach was suggested by Kane and Staiger (2002) for producing efficient estimates of 
school quality, but has a long history in the statistics literature (see, for example, Morris, 1983) 
and is closely related to the errors-in-variables approach that allows for heteroskedastic 
measurement error outlined by Sullivan (2001).  Appendix C discusses the statistical properties 
of the EB estimates in greater detail. 
 
 
IV. Empirical Strategy 
In this section, we first describe how one can estimate the reduced form relationship 
between parent requests and teacher characteristics in an OLS framework.  We then explain the 
shortcomings of this approach and develop a simple model of parent requests that allows us to 
recover the underlying preferences of the parents.   
                                                 
16 We choose not to make these the focal point of the analysis because (1) it would require dropping a small subset 
of teachers for whom we only observe one year of student achievement data and (2) it is quite difficult to adequately 
account for estimation error in the value-added in a student fixed effect model.  This is due to the fact that because 
the student fixed effects are imprecisely estimated, the estimation error of the value-added measures has a fairly high 
correlation across teachers within a specific school. 
17 While we make use of extremely rich panel data on student achievement, the value-added specification described 
above has limitations nonetheless.  As Todd and Wolpin (2003) point out, even if one is not concerned about 
omitted variables (e.g., when students and teachers are randomly assigned to classes), the   j d  will generally not 
capture the impact of teacher j alone, but will also incorporate the effects of optimizing behavior on the part of 
families.  For example, if a child gets randomly assigned to a poor teacher, her parents may spend more time helping 
the child with schoolwork or enroll her in an after-school program. 15 
 
The Reduced Form Relationship between Parent Requests and Teacher Characteristics 
We estimate the simple reduced form relationship between teacher characteristics and 
parent requests via OLS with the following specification:    
(2)  jkt jt demo j va j principal kgt jkt y demo va principal g e = B + B + B + +  
where jkt y measures the requests received by teacher j in school k in year t,  jt demo  includes 
teacher background characteristics such as experience and educational background as well as 
classroom characteristics such as whether the teacher taught a mixed-grade class that year,  j va  is 
the value-added measure of teacher effectiveness in raising student achievement described in the 
previous section, j principal  includes the three factors derived from the principal surveys 
described in the previous section, and  kgt g is a vector of fixed effects for each school-grade-year 
combination.  To account for heteroskedasticity in parent requests due to school size and 
variation in school policies, we normalize the number of requests by subtracting the average 
number of requests for a particular school-grade-year and dividing by the number of students in 
the cohort (i.e., the total number of parents who could have made a request).  Our estimates will 
thus capture how particular characteristics influence the percent of parents requesting a particular 
teacher.  The inclusion of fixed effects for school-grade-year ensures that our identification 
comes from variation within the relevant choice set facing parents.  Finally, we cluster the 
standard errors by teacher to account for the fact that we observe certain teachers over multiple 
years.   
 16 
A Structural Model of Parent Preferences for Teachers  
While the reduced form approach described above is attractive in its simplicity, it has 
several important limitations.  First, the reduced form estimates do not account for the fact that a 
teacher’s market share of parent requests is likely to respond differently to teacher quality based 
on the number of teacher choices available.  In a highly fragmented market, for example, we 
might expect a marginal change in teacher quality to have a smaller absolute effect on that 
teacher’s share than in a market with only two options.  Thus, while the OLS coefficients may 
yield a good approximation to the average effect of a particular characteristic on the market 
share, they may well perform poorly when examining grades with more or fewer teacher options 
than average.  In addition, the reduced form strategy fails to take into account that the sum of the 
market shares (including the no request option) must necessarily lie between zero and one, which 
is likely to result in reduced statistical efficiency and predicted market shares that fall outside the 
interval between zero and one.  Given our limited sample size, this is an important consideration.   
Perhaps most importantly, the reduced form model does not allow one examine how 
parent preferences or the cost of making a request vary across demographic groups.  This is 
because the costs of making a request will affect both the average number of requests as well as 
the relationship between requests and teacher attributes.  For example, if the cost of making 
requests is high for low-income families, we would expect these families to make few requests 
and to be less responsive to any particular teacher characteristic.  In this case, the reduced form 
coefficient of the interaction between parent income level and a teacher characteristic will reflect 
both preferences for the characteristic as well as the cost of making a request.  A structural model 
will allow us to separately identify these factors.  17 
While the approach we outline below is very similar to a typical conditional logit discrete 
choice model, it differs from the standard model in several ways owing to the nature of the 
choice problem we study and the data we utilize.  In particular, our estimation method must 
account for the fact that (1) we only have aggregate counts of parent requests rather than parent 
level request information, (2) the number of choice options varies across individuals depending 
on how many classes are offered in a particular school-grade-year, and (3) the expected teacher 
quality associated with making no request must be modeled as a function of the quality of all 
teachers in the choice set.
18 
We begin by assuming that the quality,  , j s q , of teacher j in school*grade s is a linear 
function of observed (by both us and the parents) teacher characteristics  , j s X : 
(3)  , , j s j s q X b = . 
In our case, the vector X includes teacher demographics such as education and experience, value-
added measures, and principal-reported evaluations of the teacher, which reflect typically 
unobservable (to the econometrician) teacher attributes.   
We next assume that there is some cost of making a request,  
(4)  s s c Z g = , 
where Z includes school and grade level covariates s Z .
19   In our baseline specification, we 
assume that the cost of making a request is a function of the child’s grade and school (i.e., the 
                                                 
18 In these respects, our approach is related to a larger industrial organization literature on the estimation of 
preference parameters and demand elasticities based on aggregate market shares and distributions of consumer 
characteristics (see, for example, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995).  The model we develop is similar to the 
Berry-Levinsohn-Pakes (BLP) models common in IO, but is simpler than many recent applications of BLP-type 
models which incorporate additional complexity in an effort to calculate reasonable own and cross-price elasticities 
of demand.  Because the current paper doesn’t examine these issues, we use a simpler framework. 
19 With individual data, we would of course have the cost be a function of student or parent characteristics.  This is 
not generally possible with the data available to us. 18 
vector Z will include a set of grade fixed effects and school fixed effects).
20  This assumption is 
motivated by the possibility that school administrators may have different informal policies 
regarding requests, and that requests may be more or less acceptable for children of different 
ages.
21   
The utility parent, i, receives from requesting teacher j is given by that teacher’s quality, 
minus some cost, s c , plus an idiosyncratic utility component, ijs e , that captures the idiosyncratic 
match quality between the teacher and the child.  Assuming that every parent request is granted 
and that parent utility is linear in quality and cost, we can write the utility associated with parent 
i requesting teacher j as: 
(5)  , , , , , i j s j s s i j s U X Z b g e = - + . 
We will assume that this utility component is i.i.d. from a type 1 extreme value distribution.
22   
If a parent makes no request, we will impose that the expected teacher equals the average 
teacher quality in the parent’s choice set.  Essentially, we assume that parents believe that if they 
make no request their child has an equal probability of being assigned to any teacher in the 
choice set.  Hence, the utility associated with no request equals the average teacher quality (not 
including the idiosyncratic match components) plus a type 1 extreme value disturbance,  no e , that 
can be interpreted as the idiosyncratic utility benefit of not making a request.
23   
                                                 
20 In Table VIII, we show that our results are robust to including school-grade-year fixed effects in the cost function. 
21 Note that the grade and school fixed effects in the cost equation implicitly capture much of the impact of family 
demographics on the average number of requests.  In our baseline specification, we do not include separate measures 
of family demographics.  However, we explicitly examine the role of family demographics in the subsequent models 
discussed below. 
22 The c.d.f. of this distribution is given by  ( ) ( )
, ,
, , ( ) exp
i j s
i j s F e
e m e
- - = - , where m  is a location parameter.  The mean 
of the idiosynctratic utility term equals  .5772 m + .  This mean is not identified since it affects the utility of all 
options symmetrically.  Thus, one can assume that  ijs e  is mean zero without loss of generality. 
23 In addition to the idiosyncratic utility associated with each teacher, there is also an idiosyncratic cost associated 
with making any request.  One can think of the negative of this cost as the idiosyncratic benefit of not making a 
request.  Since what matters is not the level of utility of each choice but rather the difference in utility between any 19 
(6) 
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where K is the number of teachers in the choice set.
24 
Of course, it is possible that sophisticated parents may recognize that their child is less 
likely to be assigned to a popular teacher if the parent does not submit a request.  In Table IX, we 
show that our results are robust to changing this aspect of the model, and instead assuming that 
the expected teacher quality equals the weighted average of teacher quality in the parent’s choice 
set where the weights correspond to the number of vacancies in a teacher’s class.  For example, 
if one of three teachers in a particular grade is always oversubscribed and the other two teachers 
receive an equal number of requests, then a parent who does not make a request will expect his 
or her child to receive the average quality of the two less popular teachers.   
If each parent chooses whichever alternative yields the highest utility, a teacher’s 
expected market share and the probability that any given family selects teacher j is given by:
25   
 






































The no request share is: 
                                                                                                                                                             
two choices, it is irrelevant whether the idiosyncratic cost of making a request is included in the “no request” option 
or in every teacher request option. 
24 This framework imposes that the idiosyncratic utility terms for teachers average to zero within each choice set for 
each parent.  Because the mean of the idiosyncratic utility terms is not identified, one can assume that it equals zero 
without loss of generality.  Imposing that these idiosyncratic terms average to zero within a finite sample is a 
stronger assumption.   
25 See McFadden (1973) for a proof. 20 
















































Given the assumptions above, the probability that we observe a particular distribution of requests 
in a grade is given by: 
(9) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2
1 1 2 2 Pr , ,..,




num n num n num n
A t t t no
= = = =
= = =
, 
where  i num  is a variable corresponding to the number of parents selecting teacher i,  i n  is the 
particular realization of this variable, and A is a constant that forms part of the multinomial 
distributions and simply shows the number of different ways in which a particular combination 
of teachers could be selected.  This constant varies on the basis of the number of choices 
available and the aggregate counts we observe.  Because it is not a function of the probabilities 
themselves, we can ignore it for the purposes of estimation. 
It is then straightforward to identify the preference and cost parameters using maximum 
likelihood.  Using equation (9), we can find the probability of observing a particular set of 
aggregate choices in each grade*school*year combination.  Note that these probabilities are a 
function of preference and cost parameters of our model.  We then multiply the probabilities for 
each grade-school-year combination to determine the probability of observing the entire set of 
aggregate choices that we find in the data.   This product gives us our likelihood function and 
allows us to estimate the model. 21 
To this point, we have assumed that the idiosyncratic error terms are independent within 
each choice set.  This is unlikely to be the case as teachers differ in both observable and 
unobservable ways.  Because of this, the estimation method may yield standard errors that are 
significantly understated.  Furthermore, some teachers appear in multiple years in our dataset, 
further complicating statistical inference.  To address these problems, we bootstrap the standard 
errors, clustering at the school-grade level.  This takes into account unobserved systematic 
differences across teachers as well as persistence in unobserved teacher quality.
26 
  While we do not know which parents made each request, we can take advantage of the 
aggregate demographic information we have for each grade-school-year combination to estimate 
the differences in costs and preferences across different types of individuals.  This approach has 
been used extensively in the industrial organization literature to estimate preference parameters 
and demand elasticities based on aggregate market shares and distributions of consumer 
characteristics (see, for example, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995).  The intuition is that by 
examining how the relationship between teacher characteristics and requests changes with the 
fraction of, for example, low-income families in the grade, we can identify how the structural 
parameters vary with income. 
  More specifically, suppose we have two types of families, l and h.  Each type has 
different parameters for both their utility and cost functions.  If this is true, the expected market 
share of teacher j will equal: 
                                                 
26 To the extent that teachers change grades across years, the clustering procedure may not fully account for the non-
independence of the utility terms across years for a specific teacher.  Fortunately, nearly all teachers teach the same 
grade in all years. 22 
(10) 
( ) ( )
( )


















j s h s h h
j s s K
k s h K
k
j s h s h
k
j s l s l h
s K
k s l K
k












































where the subscripts denote the type of family making the request and 
h
s w  represents the share of 
type h families within the school*grade, s.  Though theoretically, we could identify how school 
and grade affected the cost of making a request separately for families in each of the two groups, 
in practice there is insufficient variation in family demographics across grades within a school to 
do so.  For this reason, we will constrain the school and grade fixed effects to the same for each 
group.  We will allow the cost of making a request to vary only by a constant across groups.  
Even this parameter will be estimated with insufficient precision to draw strong conclusions, 
however. 
While the model described above captures many of the essential features of the parent 
request decision, it does have several limitations.  First, we assume that all requests are honored.  
While this is not strictly true, our discussions with principals suggest that the vast majority of 
requests are granted so this assumption is unlikely to affect the main conclusions of our analysis.  
Second, as is the case in all conditional logit models, our assumption of independent errors 
implies an assumption regarding the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA).  In settings 
where certain choices are thought to be extremely good substitutes for each other (e.g., a red bus 
and a blue bus), this assumption is particularly unrealistic.  To the extent that teachers are 23 
unlikely to be close substitutes to each other, this assumption is less problematic.
27  Moreover, 
while the IIA assumption is particularly problematic for predicting market shares, it does not 
necessarily introduce substantial bias into parameter estimates (Glazerman 1998).    
 
Limitations of Using Aggregate Request Data 
While the use of aggregate data will not affect our inferences regarding the average 
preference parameters in the population, it does limit our ability to examine variation in parent 
preferences across individual demographic characteristics.
28  Ideally, in order to identify how 
family preferences vary with demographics, one would interact characteristics of the requested 
teacher with characteristics of the requesting parent.  As explained above, it is possible to 
leverage information regarding the distribution of demographic characteristics across school-
grade-years to examine these interactions.  This approach has two limitations, however.  First, 
because we use aggregate data, we know the characteristics of a requesting parent only 
probabilistically.  This reduces the efficiency of the resulting parameter estimates.  Second, 
aggregate data limits our ability to distinguish between the following cases: (a) parents whose 
children attend low-income schools have different preferences than parents whose children 
attend higher-income schools; and (b) low-income parents themselves (regardless the school 
their children attend) have different preferences than higher-income parents.
29  To the extent that 
                                                 
27 In the industrial organization literature, researchers are particularly concerned with this aspect of the discrete 
choice models.  If a consumer’s utility function is simply composed of a small number of observable components 
and an independent error, then as the price of a good rises the model predicts substitution towards other popular 
products regardless of their similarity to the original product.  Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) propose a model 
with random coefficients in the utility function.  This type of model predicts that as the price of one good rises, 
consumers will substitute toward other goods with similar observable characteristics.    
28 To see this, note that the teacher is the relevant unit of observation in our analysis.  Assuming that we have not 
omitted any important teacher characteristics and the functional form of the included covariates is correct, our 
estimates will be unbiased.  
29 More generally, if one uses aggregate data, there is a choice of two identifying assumptions with regard to 
estimating the relationship between demographics and preferences.  First, one can assume that unobserved 24 
many educational policy decisions are made at the school level, however, this limitation may not 
be particularly important from a practical standpoint.
30       
 
V.  Results 
  Having outlined our estimation strategy, we will now present and discuss our findings.  
We begin by presenting OLS estimates of the relationship between parent requests and teacher 
characteristics, but quickly move to the structural estimates described above.  A more extensive 
set of OLS results, that includes interactions between family demographics and parent choices, is 
presented in Appendix D.  All of the results from the OLS models are consistent with the main 
structural estimates presented here.    
 
Reduced Form Estimates 
Table IV presents the estimates from equation (2) where the outcome measure is the 
normalized number of positive requests for each teacher.
31  Column 1 focuses teacher 
demographics and aspects of classroom organization.  We observe that more experienced receive 
more requests than first year teachers or teachers who are new to the school.  Interestingly, we 
                                                                                                                                                             
preferences for teacher characteristics are not systematically correlated to neighborhood demographics.  This would 
be true if, for example, families were randomly assigned to neighborhoods.  In this case, the method we describe 
above will perfectly identify the average preferences of high-income (non-minority) and low-income (minority) 
families.  An alternative assumption is that there exists perfect Teibout sorting to neighborhoods on the basis of 
preferences for educational outputs.  In this case, all families within a school have the same preferences and average 
demographics are simply a proxy for what one might describe as community values.  Under this assumption, one 
can use aggregate data to observe how community preferences vary with average demographics.  Of course, the 
truth is likely to be some combination of these two extremes and without individual-level data, one cannot test 
between them.   
30 In addition, the use of aggregate requires that we assume that families within a particular demographic group are 
homogenous (except for idiosyncratic preference and cost shocks).  It is possible, however, that non-free lunch 
children in a disadvantaged school differ systematically from non-free lunch children in a wealthy school.  To the 
extent that this is true, our estimates of the differences in preferences and costs between different groups may be 
overstated.  They will, however, have the correct sign and show approximate differences in the parameters of 
interest. 
31 Specifications that incorporate information on negative requests yield comparable results (see Table IX).   25 
also find some evidence that parents have preferences regarding certain aspects of classroom 
organization.  For example, parents appear to dislike mixed-grade classrooms, which are 
generally created when there are not enough children enrolled in a particular grade level to 
justify a new class composed entirely of students from that grade.  In fact, teachers in these 
mixed-grade classrooms receive 7 percentage points fewer requests than their colleagues.  This is 
consistent with the evidence that mixed-grade classrooms reduce student achievement (see Sims, 
2005).  Principals in the district indicate teachers in these classrooms often teach one grade and 
ask a teacher’s aide to teach the other grade, particularly in subjects such as math and science 
where the material varies across grades and teaching a heterogeneous ability group is difficult.  
To the extent that parents are aware of this arrangement, one can easily imagine why such 
classes are unpopular.   
In column 2, we show the relationship between teacher value-added and parent requests.  
The point estimate indicates that teachers with higher value-added measures receive more 
requests.  While the estimates are not significant, the magnitude implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in teacher value-added is associated with roughly 1.2 percentage points more 
parent requests.  Given that the average teacher receives requests from roughly 9.2 percent of 
parents, this reflects a 13 percent effect.  In column 3, we see that parents are significantly more 
likely to request teachers who principals rate highly in terms of raising student achievement.  
Indeed, a one standard deviation increase in a teacher’s achievement rating is associated with a 
4.2 percentage point (45 percent) increase in parent requests.  Column 4 shows that parents also 
place an extremely high value on the ability of teachers to make their children happy.  A one 
standard deviation increase in the student satisfaction rating is associated with a 5.5 percentage 
point (53 percent) increase in parent requests.   26 
The specification in column 5 includes all of the principal measures together with the 
estimated value-added.  We see that the parent satisfaction measure is more highly correlated 
with parent requests than the achievement measure.  In addition, the principal achievement 
measure is more strongly related to parental requests than the value-added measure, which 
indicates either that parents prefer the qualities captured in the principal measure more than the 
value-added measure or that parents can more easily observe the qualities identified by the 
principal.  To the extent that the principal measure includes factors such as classroom 
organization and management, the later explanation seems compelling.
 32  In column 6, we show 
results from a specification in which we include teacher demographics, value-added measures, 
and the principal evaluation factors.  The results are substantively the same, though the 
coefficients on a number of the teacher demographic variables have fallen in magnitude. 
Column 7 of Table IV shows the estimates of the teacher quality parameters from our 
structural model.  The average marginal effects of each attribute, shown in the square brackets, 
are computed by calculating the marginal effect for each individual and averaging across all 
observations.  We see that the structural model produces results quite similar to the reduced form 
approach.  Most importantly, the relationship between parent requests and teacher attributes that 
capture educational outputs such as student achievement and satisfaction remains strong.   
                                                 
32 Interestingly, we also see that teachers who the principal rates as better able to get along with colleagues receive 
fewer requests from parents.  This is consistent with principals providing systematically biased evaluations of 
teacher attributes.  Suppose, for example, that conditional on actual ability to raise standardized test scores a 
principal gives higher evaluations to teachers she likes.  In this case, we expect that between two teachers with the 
same principal-rated instructional ability, the better-liked teacher will be less effective at raising student 
achievement.  Jacob and Lefgren (2005) explore this issue in greater detail. 27 
 
Main Structural Estimates 
Having established the baseline results for the structural model, we now turn to the 
interaction between demographics and parent preferences.  For the reasons mentioned earlier, we 
focus on the coefficients from our structural model.  We allow the preference parameters to vary 
arbitrarily across group and allow the cost of making a request to vary across demographic 
groups, grades and schools.  Doing so allows the probability of selecting a particular teacher to 
vary arbitrarily with the demographic makeup of the class.  The demographic characteristics we 
consider include the child’s eligibility for free or reduced price lunch, ethnic/racial classification, 
and prior achievement level.  For the sake of parsimony, the models described below limit the 
teacher characteristics to covariates that reflect two critical education outputs – student 
achievement and student satisfaction – though we obtain comparable results from models that 
include additional teacher characteristics (see Table IX).
33   
To provide a basis for comparison, the first column in Table V shows estimates where the 
preference and cost parameters do not vary across groups.  As before, we find that parents have a 
strong preference for teachers who promote student satisfaction and a relatively weak but 
statistically significant preference for teachers who promote student achievement.  Specifically, a 
one standard deviation increase in the student satisfaction measure will result in a teacher 
receiving 3.9 percentage points (42 percent) more requests whereas a one standard deviation 
increase in the student achievement measure will result in a teacher receiving 1.5 percentage 
points (16 percent) more requests.  
                                                 
33 Of course, it is possible to examine whether preferences for other teacher characteristics such as experience or 
gender vary with family demographics.  However, it is difficult to interpret these results because it is unclear what 
educational outputs these characteristics may capture, and whether this would be consistent across demographic 
group. 
 28 
Columns 2-10 in Table V come from specifications that allow the preferences parameters 
to vary by family demographics.  Assuming that all parents can observe teacher behaviors and 
attributes that are correlated with these characteristics, the estimates thus reflect the preferences 
of different groups of parents.  It appears that families who are not eligible for free lunch 
strongly value parent satisfaction and are essentially indifferent to the principal’s report of a 
teacher’s ability to increase student achievement.  The situation is reversed for the parents of 
children who are eligible for free lunch.  These results are highly significant.   
These results are echoed when we examine the preferences of minority and non-minority 
families.  In particular, minority families value a teacher’s ability to increase achievement while 
non-minority families appear to care only about student satisfaction.  The same picture emerges 
when we look at the requests of parents whose students are in the top and bottom half of the 
initial achievement distribution.
34  In all three comparisons, the differences in the preference for 
student satisfaction are significant at the 5 percent level; the differences in the preference for 
principal-reported achievement factor are generally significant at the 10 percent level or better. 
To examine the robustness of this result, Table VI presents estimates from models that 
include the principal measure of student satisfaction, but replace the principal measure of a 
teacher’s effectiveness at raising student achievement with our value-added measure of teacher 
effectiveness.  The results are comparable to those presented above.  That is, low-income and 
minority parents care more about student achievement and much less about student satisfaction 
while higher-income and non-minority parents have the opposite preferences.   
                                                 
34 As noted earlier, we use test scores from the prior year to determine the percent of students scoring in the top half 
of the district distribution in a school-grade-year.  Because we do not have student test scores for the 2003-04 school 
year, we use test scores for the 2002-03 school year to calculate the prior ability of the cohorts entering in 2004-05.  
Unfortunately, we do not have first grade test scores for 2002-03.  For this reason, we must exclude second grade 
classes in both 2003-04 and 2004-05 and third grade classes in 2004-05 from the analyses shown in columns 8-10 
(in both Table VII-A and VII-B).  This is one reason that the reduced precision of these results. 29 
  The fact that parents of disadvantaged children appear to care about a teacher’s ability to 
increase achievement more than student satisfaction is consistent with a decreasing marginal 
utility of student achievement.  If all parents have a strictly concave function defined over 
student achievement and student happiness, to the extent that high-income and non-minority 
parents have children with a higher baseline level of achievement, we expect that on the margin 
child happiness will be more valued than further achievement gains in school. 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
The results presented above suggest that parents in lower vs. higher-income schools have 
quite different preferences for their children’s education.  In this section, we explore the 
robustness of this finding.   
First, one might be concerned that the level or variance of teacher quality differs 
substantially across schools and is associated with family demographics in a way that raises 
doubt about the interpretation presented here.  For example, it may be that the average teacher’s 
ability to raise student achievement is sufficiently high in advantaged schools that parents do not 
need to focus on student achievement.  Similarly, one might speculate that there is so little 
variance in the teacher achievement measures in higher-income schools that parents believe that 
all teachers are effectively equal along this dimension and thus not place any weight on it in 
choosing a teacher.  Both stories would explain the pattern of results we find without implying 
differential preferences for achievement.  
In order to explore this possibility, we regress various measures of teacher quality on the 
percentage of students in a particular school-grade-year who are eligible for free-lunch.
35  The 
results are presented in Table VII.  All standard errors are clustered at the school level.  Because 
                                                 
35 The results are similar for the percentage of minority students and the average lagged achievement measure.  30 
the principal factors are created by first normalizing the principal survey items to mean zero and 
standard deviation one within school, it is not useful to compare the principal factors across 
schools.  We therefore focus on “raw” principal responses (measured on a scale of 1-10) for 
several key survey items.
36  
Columns 1-4 examine the level of various teacher characteristics.  The F-statistics on 
models that include only school fixed effects (shown in the bottom row of the table) confirm that 
the level of teacher quality varies significantly across schools.  However, this variation does not 
appear to be associated with student poverty.  The estimates on percent eligible for free-lunch 
indicate that there is no significant relationship between school poverty level and teacher value-
added or principal reported measures of teacher quality.
37  The dependent variable in columns 5-
8 is the range of a particular principal rating within the relevant choice set (i.e., the 
school*grade*year).  The results indicate that the range of principal ratings is smaller in school-
grade-years with a higher percentage of students who are eligible for free-lunch.            
A second concern involves the use of aggregate data.  To the extent that minority or low-
income parents never (or very rarely) make a request, observed differences in preferences across 
schools cannot reflect preference variation related to a child’s own free lunch status.  To explore 
this possibility, Table VIII presents information on individual parent requests we were able to 
obtain from two schools.
38  The first column shows the average demographic characteristics in 
the district in 2002-03 to provide a baseline from which to assess the two schools we examine.  
These two schools are roughly at the 25
th and 75
th percentiles of the distribution in terms of free 
                                                 
36 Of course, differences in principal ratings across schools may result from differences in how harshly principals 
rate their teachers. 
37 See Appendix B for more detailed discussion of how the value-added measures are calculated.  
38 For reasons of convenience, these two principals preferred to give us a spreadsheet with individual requests as 
opposed to the aggregated requests.  In terms of request policies and request rates, they are similar to other schools 
in the district. 31 
lunch eligibility, and thus provide a snapshot which is likely to generalize to the broader sample 
of schools.  Columns 2 and 4 show the demographic composition of the students in these 
schools; columns 3 and 5 show the composition of students who made requests in these schools.  
In both schools we see that the students who make requests are more likely to be white and less 
likely to be eligible for free lunch than the average student in the school.  This confirms our 
earlier findings that free lunch and minority status are associated with increased costs of making 
a request.  However, we also see that a non-trivial percent of requests come from families who 
are Hispanic, do not speak English as a first language and/or are eligible for free lunch  This 
lends credence to our interpretation that the findings reflect differences in preferences between 
observably different groups of parents within a school.   
Finally, Table IX examines a variety of alternative specifications in order to test the 
robustness of our results.  For the sake of simplicity, we only present estimates for free-lunch 
eligibility.  Other results are available on request.  The first row presents the baseline estimates 
taken from columns 2 and 3 of Table VI.  In this baseline specification, the cost of making a 
request was modeled as a function of grade fixed effects, school fixed effects and the 
demographic characteristic (i.e., free lunch eligibility).  In row 2, we allow the cost function to 
vary only with grade and the demographic characteristic.  The results are substantively the same, 
though the significance of some coefficients is reduced.  In row 3, we allow the cost function to 
vary by grade*school*year, yielding estimates similar to the baseline.  The next set of results 
examines alternative specifications of the preference parameters.  In the baseline model, parent 
preferences are modeled as function of two key outputs – the teacher’s ability to promote student 
achievement and student satisfaction (both principal-reported).  Row 4 includes the principal-
reported teacher collegiality measure; row 5 includes a several teacher demographics as well as 32 
the collegiality factor.  The results for both specifications are comparable to the baseline.  Row 6 
presents estimates of a model where the outcome measure includes negative as well as positive 
request information.  More specifically, we apportion each negative request to the other teachers 
in the school-grade-year in proportion to the number of positive requests these teachers received.  
Our results remain the same.  Row 7 shows the results of a model that uses alternative principal 
measures.  Recall that the student achievement and satisfaction factors used in the baseline 
analysis were created from a factor analysis that included all of the individual principal items 
except the principal report of parent satisfaction.  We excluded this item because of concerns that 
it is highly influenced by parent requests, which introduces a simultaneity problem into the 
model and may bias our estimates.  As a further guard against this simultaneity problem, we 
regress the original factors on the principal satisfaction item on use the residual from the 
regression as an alternative principal measure of a teacher’s ability to raise student achievement 
and promote student satisfaction.  These residual factors are, by construction, orthogonal to a 
principal’s evaluation of a teacher’s ability to promote parent satisfaction.  As we see from the 
estimates in row 7, the estimates using these alternative measures yield very similar results, 
though there is a decrease in the precision of the estimates.  Finally, in row 8 we assume that the 
expected teacher quality associated with making no request is a weighted average of teacher 
quality where the weights correspond to the number of vacancies in each class.  This is 
consistent with a model in which parents are fully rational and have perfect information.  Again, 
the results are virtually identical to the baseline. 33 
 
VI. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the parents’ revealed preferences for their child’s schooling.  
We find that on average parents strongly prefer teachers that principals describe as the most 
popular with students, and place relatively less value on a teacher’s ability to raise standardized 
math or reading achievement.  These aggregate effects, however, mask striking differences 
across family demographics.  Low-income and minority families strongly value student 
achievement and are essentially indifferent to the principal’s report of a teacher’s ability to 
promote student satisfaction.  The results are reversed for higher-income and non-minority 
families. 
Our findings suggest that what parents want from school is likely to depend on family 
circumstances as well as parent preferences.  Thus, we might expect advantaged and 
disadvantaged parents to exhibit systematic differences with regards particular educational 
policies or programs even if both sets of parents have the same underlying utility functions.  This 
has important implications for current school reform strategies.  For example, it suggests that 
communities are likely to react quite differently to accountability policies, such as those 
embodied in No Child Left Behind.  It also suggests that school choice could lead to segregation 
across demographic groups driven by the preferences of the parents.  At the same time, however, 
our findings imply that low-income families are not only able to recognize high quality teachers, 
but also strongly value student achievement.  This result belies the concern that school choice 
programs will not benefit poor children because their parents will not fully recognize or 
sufficiently value academic achievement.  Finally, our analysis suggests the results of prior 
school choice studies may be considerably more difficult to interpret than previously realized.  In 34 
particular, the preference for attending racial or socially homogeneous schools that has been 
documented in prior literature may not reflect a desire for segregation per se, but instead may 
reflect an interest in a particular type of curriculum or pedagogy with the socioeconomic 
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Appendix A: Sample Principal Survey Form 
 
We thank you for agreeing to answer the questions in this survey.  By answering this survey, you will aid in determining what aspects of teacher effectiveness are 
most important for students, parents, and principals.  Your responses to these surveys will be completely confidential.  They will never be revealed to any 
teachers, administrators, parents, or students.  Only statistical averages and correlations will be presented in reports for the district and possible publication in an 
academic journal. 
 
We will now ask you to rate teachers on the basis of a number of different performance criteria.  Please use the following descriptions in rating teachers on a 
scale of 1 to 10. 
 
1-2:   Inadequate – The teacher performs substantially below minimal standards in this area. 
3-5:   Adequate – The teacher meets minimal standards (but could make substantial improvements in this area).    
6-8:   Very good – The teacher is highly effective in this area.       
9-10:   Exceptional – The teacher is among the best I have ever seen in this area (e.g., in the top 1% of teachers).   
Part I: Teacher Ratings 
Teacher Characteristic  Teacher 1  Teacher 2  Teacher 3  Teacher 4  Teacher 5 
Dedication and work ethic   
 
       
Organization    
 
       
Classroom management   
 
       
Raising student math achievement   
 
       
Raising student reading achievement   
 
       
Role model for students   
 
       
Student satisfaction with teacher   
 
       
Parent satisfaction with teacher   
 
       
Positive relationship with colleagues   
 
       
Positive relationship with administrators           
Overall teacher effectiveness           
How many years have you worked with this teacher (in your 
current school or another school)? 
 
 
       
How many years has this individual been teaching (in your school 
or another)?  Please give your best guess if you are not certain.   
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TABLE A-1   






























Dedication and work ethic  1.00                     
Organization  0.595  1.00                   
Classroom management  0.517  0.717  1.00                 
Raising student math 
achievement  0.516  0.637  0.640  1.00               
Raising student reading 
achievement  0.569  0.641  0.643  0.629  1.00             
Role model for students  0.454  0.533  0.511  0.475  0.502  1.00           
Student satisfaction with 
teacher  0.336  0.467  0.525  0.415  0.427  0.757  1.00         
Parent satisfaction with 
teacher  0.376  0.497  0.581  0.453  0.503  0.689  0.785  1.00       
Positive relationship with 
colleagues  0.335  0.392  0.342  0.350  0.384  0.624  0.574  0.544  1.00     
Positive relationship with 
administrators  0.586  0.707  0.727  0.696  0.708  0.733  0.685  0.538  0.759  1.00   
Overall teacher 
effectiveness  0.586  0.707  0.727  0.696  0.708  0.733  0.685  0.691  0.656  0.675  1.00 
Notes: All measures are normalized within school to mean zero and standard deviation one. 39 
Appendix B: The Construction of Teacher Value-Added Measures 
 
This appendix describes several important identification and estimation issues in greater 
detail.  The greatest challenge in estimating measures of teacher value-added is to account for 
non-random assignment of students and teachers.  With the assistance of district administrators, 
we conducted detailed interviews with principals to ascertain exactly how students are assigned 
to classrooms and to explicitly examine how the assignment process may influence our 
estimates.  In many schools, particularly in sixth grade, it turns out that students are tracked for 
math instruction.  In these cases, we do not construct value-added measures for math 
achievement, and a teacher’s value-added is therefore based solely on his or her performance in 
raising reading scores.    
To account for unobservable, time-invariant student characteristics, we estimate models 
that include student fixed effects i l  with either achievement levels or gains as the dependent 
variable:   
(B1)  ijkt jt it t k j jt i ijkt y C X y f d a l e = B+ G+ + + + + +  
(B2)  1 ijkt ijkt jt it t k j jt i ijkt y y C X y f d a l e - - = B+ G+ + + + + +  
We find that teacher effects that include virtually no controls are highly correlated with value-
added measures that include a much more detailed set of controls, suggesting that students are 
not systematically sorting into classrooms along observable dimensions and thus providing some 
assurance that they may not be sorting along unobservable dimensions either.   
Finally, in order to directly examine how parental requests might influence our estimates 
of teacher value-added, we examine the relationship between parent request and student 
performance for a subset of our sample for which we have access to individual request data. 
Conditional on initial achievement and basic demographics, we find that the students whose 40 
parents submit requests do not perform significantly better or worse than non-requesting 
students.  This suggests that teacher assignment on the basis of parent requests is unlikely to be 
highly correlated with unobserved student ability.  
While the estimation of the teacher effects described in the text is relatively 
straightforward, one point is worth noting.  The identification of teacher quality in a typical 
value-added model is based on a teacher’s performance relative to other teachers in the district 
(even if school fixed effects are included), owing to teacher mobility across schools and the 
presence of covariates that likely vary considerably across classrooms.  In our analysis, we 
believe it is more reasonable to measure teacher quality relative to a school norm, since this is 
most likely the relevant comparison group that parents will consider.  To insure we identify 
estimates of teacher quality relative to other teachers within the same school, we examine 
teachers who are in their most recent school (i.e. for the small number of switching teachers, we 
drop any observations from their first school), include school fixed effects and then constrain the 
teacher fixed effects to sum to zero within each school. 
For the table in which we examine how the average quality of teachers varies across 
schools, we estimate teacher value-added with a specification that includes student fixed effects 
but not school fixed effects.  The student fixed effects ensure that our results are not biased by 
unobserved heterogeneity across schools.  We also include teachers in all schools at which they 
taught.  The movement of teachers and students across schools identifies teacher quality 
estimates that can be compared across schools.  With such specifications, however, the 
estimation error of teacher value added is often highly correlated across teachers.  This makes it 
difficult to appropriately correct for the attenuation bias resulting from the use of value-added 
measures that are estimated. 41 
To show that our primary results are robust to our construction of teacher value-added, 
we show estimation results that rely on alternative value-added measures.  In rows 2 and 3, we 
control for teacher experience to take into account that teacher quality may be changing over 
time.  The results are unchanged.  In row 4, we calculate value-added using achievement gains 
that take into account that the average gain differs based on a student’s lagged test score.  This 
yields results that are again similar to the baseline.  In rows 5 and 6 we rely on value-added 
specifications with student fixed effects, which fails to change the estimates.  Finally, in rows 7-
10, we calculate value-added based on only reading or math achievement.  The results are again 
virtually identical with the exception of when we calculate value-added using normalized reading 
gains and student fixed effects.  Even in this specification, however, the standard errors are too 
large to rule out an effect similar to the baseline estimate.  Overall, it appears that our findings 
are robust to our construction of value-added measures.42 
TABLE B-1 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR VALUE-ADDED SPECIFICATIONS  
   
Student Satisfaction Factor 
Structural Coefficient 
[Marginal Effect] 
Value-added Measure  
Structural Coefficient 
[Marginal Effect] 
    Eligible for 
Free Lunch 








Dependent variable is a composite math-reading score.  Includes 
school, grade and year fixed effects, prior achievement and other 


























Dependent variable is achievement gain score based on math-reading 
composite normalized by prior achievement.  Does not include student 









5  Baseline + student fixed effects (but excluding lagged test score and 





















































Notes:  Sample includes only grades 2-6 (n=331).  Demographics are measured at the school-grade-year level.  * = significant at 5 percent level.  † = significant 
at 10 percent level.  43 
Appendix C: Statistical Properties of Empirical Bayes (EB) Estimates of Teacher Quality 
The intuition behind the EB approach is that one can construct more efficient estimates of 
teacher quality by “shrinking” noisy estimates of teacher effectiveness to the mean of the teacher 
quality distribution.  Because each realization of a teacher’s value-added reflects both actual 
ability as well as measurement error, noisy estimates provide less information regarding true 
teacher quality than more precise estimates.  The EB estimate for teacher j is essentially a 
weighted average of the teacher’s fixed effect and the average value-added within the population, 
where the weight is a function of the reliability of each teacher’s fixed effect.  This approach is 
conceptually quite similar to the approach outlined by Sullivan (2001), which involves extending 
a traditional errors-in-variables correction to allow for heteroskedastic measurement error.    
Suppose we have a noisy measure of teacher quality  ˆ
j j j e d d = + , where  j d  is actual 
teacher ability,  ˆ
j d  is unbiased OLS estimate of teacher ability, and  j e  is a mean zero error term.  
Further assume that both  j d  and  j e  are normally distributed with a known mean and variance.  
If one knew the mean and variance of the distributions of  j d  and  j e , one could construct a more 
efficient estimate of  j d  that optimally incorporates available intuition.  Indeed, it is 













.  The EB 
estimate for teacher j is exactly this expected value:   ˆ ˆ |
EB
j j j E d d d ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ .  In practice, the mean of 
the teacher ability distribution, d , is unidentified so all of the effects are centered around zero.  
Note that we assume that teacher quality is distributed normally with variance
2
d s  while
2
j e s  is the 
variance of the measurement error for teacher j’s fixed effect, which can vary across 
observations depending on the amount of data used to construct the estimate.     44 
Of course, the mean of the teacher quality distribution and the variance of the error term 
are not generally known and must be estimated.  One can construct an empirical analog to the 
expectation above using the method proposed by Morris (1983).  This essentially involves using 
the estimated mean and variance to calculate the appropriate shrinkage factor,  j l , and 
incorporating an appropriate degrees of freedom adjustment.
39  We will refer to this estimate as 
ˆEB
j d .  The resulting properties of this EB estimate are essentially the same as if these parameters 
were known, so for simplicity we will act as if the parameters were known for the remainder of 
the discussion. 
One can easily show that using the EB estimates as an explanatory variable in a 
regression context will yield point estimates that are unaffected by the attenuation bias that 
would exist if one used simple OLS estimates.  Define the error of the EB estimate as j v , so 
that ˆEB
j j j v d d = + .  Because the EB procedure takes advantage of all available information to 
construct the estimated teacher effect — indeed it is the empirical analog to the conditional 
expectation of  j d — the shrinkage estimator is uncorrelated with the error term: ˆ cov( , ) 0
EB v d = .  
In fact, the shrinkage estimate can also be thought of as the predicted value from a regression of 
the actual teacher quality on the noisy measure.  By construction, this prediction is orthogonal to 
the residual  j v . 
Too see that the EB estimate of teacher quality will yield unbiased estimates when used 
as an explanatory variable in a regression context, consider the following simple regression 
equation:  
                                                 
39 The degrees of freedom adjustment takes into account that the mean that we are shrinking toward is estimated—
not known. 45 
(C1) 
0 1







b b d b
= + +
= + + +
   . 
Because,  ˆEB
j d  is orthogonal to the composite error term,  1 j j v u b + , we know the resulting 
estimate of  1 b  will be unbiased. 
Now suppose that it is known that the distribution of value added varies across a set of K 
different groups.  For example, the distribution of actual teacher quality may vary by gender or 
experience.  In this case, the conditional expectation of  j d  is 
( ) ( ) ˆ ˆ | , 1 j j j k j j E group k d d l d l d = = - + , where  k d  is the mean of teacher quality of teachers in 
group k.  Additionally,  j l  must be constructed using the variance of  j d  around the group-
specific mean.  Morris’ (1983) method of constructing EB estimates readily generalizes to this 
situation, though in practice it may be necessary to impose substantial structure on the 
conditional mean.
40  The advantage of allowing the mean of the teacher quality measure to vary 
with covariates is that one can generate more precise estimates of teacher quality.  Furthermore, 
the error of the EB estimate will be orthogonal to every piece of information (e.g. gender) used 
to construct it.  This guarantees regression coefficient estimates that are unbiased by 
measurement error in a context that includes covariates besides the EB measure itself.   
 
                                                 
40 For example, one may need to assume that the conditional mean of teacher ability is a quadratic function of 
experience to conserve degrees of freedom. 46 
Appendix D: OLS Estimates of Parent Requests 
Tables VI and VII explore the heterogeneity in parent preferences across family 
demographics.  Since we do not have student-level request information, we calculate the average 
demographic characteristics of all students in each school-grade-year (e.g., the fraction of 
students who are eligible for free lunch).  We then categorize school-grade-year observations on 
the basis of these aggregate demographic measures.  To focus on educational outputs, we regress 
our normalized parent request variable on the principal’s assessment of a teacher’s ability to 
promote student satisfaction and to promote student achievement (including fixed effects for 
school-grade-year, but no other covariates).   Table D1 shows the OLS estimates for several 
different subgroups.  Column 2, for example, presents estimates for school-grade-year 
observations in which fewer than 50 percent of students were eligible for free lunch.  In this 
group, a teacher’s student satisfaction rating is strongly related to the number of requests that he 
or she receives.  The coefficient on a teacher’s achievement rating is substantially smaller and 
not significantly different than zero.  In contrast, in classes where at least 50 percent of students 
were eligible for free lunch, a teacher’s student satisfaction rating has no effect on his or her 
requests, but a teacher’s achievement rating has a strong, positive effect on parent requests.  A 
similar but even stronger pattern is apparent if one compares school-grade-year observations 
where fewer than (or at least) 20 percent of students are minority.  The estimates in columns 6-7 
that show the results by prior student achievement level suggest that this finding may be partially 
related to student achievement.
 41  Table VI presents estimates from a specification that, as 
                                                 
41 We use test scores from the prior year to determine the percent of students scoring in the top half of the district 
distribution in a school-grade-year.  Because we do not have student test scores for the 2003-04 school year, we use 
test scores for the 2002-03 school year to calculate the prior ability of the cohorts entering in 2004-05.  
Unfortunately, we do not have first grade test scores for 2002-03.  For this reason, we must exclude second grade 
classes in both 2003-04 and 2004-05 and third grade classes in 2004-05 from the analyses shown in columns 5-6 in 
Tables V-A and V-B as well as columns 8-10 in Tables VII-A and VII-B.  This is one reason that the reduced 
precision of these results. 47 
above, includes the student satisfaction measure, but replaces the principal-reported teacher 
achievement measure with the teacher value-added measure.  The results are qualitatively the 
same.   
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TABLE D-1 
OLS ESTIMATES OF HETEROGENEITY IN PARENTAL PREFERENCES BY FAMILY DEMOGRAPHICS 
Independent Variable  Full Sample 














Less than 20% 
of students are 
minority   
At least 20% 
of students are 
minority 












  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Principal’s evaluation of the teacher’s 
ability to promote student satisfaction 
















               
Principal’s evaluation of the teacher’s 
ability to raise student achievement 
















Number of observations  251  150  101  113  138  56  122 
Fraction of parents requesting any 
teacher  0.284  0.352  0.190  0.376  0.207  0.213  0.326 
Average fraction of parents requesting 
the an individual teacher  0.092  0.114  0.061  0.126  0.063  0.070  0.111 
Notes:  The unit of observation is teacher-grade-school-year.  The sample includes only grades 2-6.  For columns 5-6, the sample omits some observations for 
which prior student achievement measures are not available.  The dependent variable is the number of parent requests, normalized by subtracting off the average 
number of requests in the grade-school-year and then dividing by the student enrollment in the grade-school-year.  Demographics are measured at the school-
grade-year level.  All models include fixed effects for school-grade-year.  Standard errors clustered by teacher are shown in parentheses. * = significant at 5 
percent level.  † = significant at 10 percent level.  
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TABLE D-2 
OLS ESTIMATES OF HETEROGENEITY IN PARENTAL PREFERENCES BY FAMILY DEMOGRAPHICS 
Independent Variable  Full Sample 














Less than 20% 
of students are 
minority   
At least 20% 
of students are 
minority 












  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Principal’s evaluation of the teacher’s 
ability to promote student satisfaction 
































Number of observations    150  101  113  138  56  122 
Fraction of parents requesting any 
teacher  0.284  0.352  0.190  0.376  0.207  0.213  0.326 
Average fraction of parents requesting a 
particular teacher  0.092  0.114  0.061  0.126  0.063  0.070  0.111 
Notes:  The unit of observation is teacher-grade-school-year.  The sample includes only grades 2-6.  For columns 5-6, the sample omits some observations for 
which prior student achievement measures are not available.  The dependent variable is the number of parent requests, normalized by subtracting off the average 
number of requests in the grade-school-year and then dividing by the student enrollment in the grade-school-year.  Demographics are measured at the school-
grade-year level.  All models include fixed effects for school-grade-year.  Standard errors clustered by teacher are shown in parentheses. * = significant at 5 
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FIGURE IV 
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TABLE I   
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
  Overall  Range within choice set 
(i.e., school-grade-year) 












Male  0.14  0.34  0.36  0  1 
Age  43.69  12.58  19.24  10  29 
First year teacher  0.09  0.28  0.29  0  1 
2-5 years of experience  0.16  0.36  0.47  0  1 
6-10 years of experience  0.23  0.42  0.56  0  1 
11-20 years of experience  0.21  0.41  0.52  0  1 
21+ years experience  0.31  0.46  0.58  0  1 
First year in the school (with >1 year of 
experience)  0.07  0.26  0.28  0  1 
BA Degree at in state (but not local) college  0.14  0.35  0.40  0  1 
BA Degree at out of state college   0.04  0.19  0.16  0  0 
MA Degree  0.15  0.36  0.42  0  1 
Any additional endorsements   0.22  0.41  0.48  0  1 
Enrollment in grade-school-year  79.18  15.61  0  0  0 
Mixed grade classroom   0.10  0.31  0.12  0  0 
Two teachers in the classroom  0.03  0.18  0.09  0  0 
Dual language classroom  0.02  0.13  0.05  0  0 
Number of positive requests  6.88  6.91  10.96  6  15 
Number of negative requests  0.35  1.10  0.98  0  2 
Teacher Value-Added (EB estimate of math-
reading composite)   0.00  0.18  0.20  0.07  0.29 
Student satisfaction factor  0.05  1.00  1.29  0.05  2.14 
Student achievement factor  0.09  0.88  1.25  0.39  2.16 
Teacher collegiality factor  0.06  0.91  1.27  0.38  1.85 
Overall teacher effectiveness  8.09  1.22  1.48  0.5  2 
Dedication and work ethic  8.50  1.50  1.75  0  3 
Organization   7.97  1.55  1.99  1  3 
Classroom management  8.02  1.63  1.67  0  3 
Raising student math achievement  7.84  1.30  1.44  0  2 
Raising student reading achievement  7.78  1.37  1.56  0  3 
Role model for students  8.40  1.19  1.50  1  2 
Student satisfaction with teacher  8.35  1.06  1.25  0  2 
Parent satisfaction with teacher  8.28  1.16  1.50  1  2 
Positive relationship with colleagues  7.93  1.64  1.72  0  2 
Positive relationship with administrators  8.43  1.55  1.55  0  2 







WHICH PARENTS MAKE REQUESTS?  
  Dependent Variable = Fraction of Parents Making Requests 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
% male 
-0.44 





% eligible for free lunch   
-0.52* 





% minority     
-0.72* 
(0.17)   
-0.32 
(0.32)   
% receiving special education 







Number of observations  80  80  80  80  80  80 
R-squared  0.04  0.37  0.36  0.02  0.40  0.39 
Notes: The unit of observation is a school-grade-year (n=80).  Each column represents a separate OLS regression.  
All models also include grade fixed effects.  Standard errors clustered at the school-year level are shown in 





FACTOR LOADINGS DERIVED FROM PRINCIPAL RATING ITEMS 
Item 
Factor 1 - 
Student 
Satisfaction 
Factor 2 – 
Achievement 
Factor 3 - 
Collegiality 
Dedication and work ethic  -0.132  0.664  0.165 
Organization   0.004  0.830  0.013 
Classroom management  0.184  0.827  -0.175 
Raising student math achievement  -0.005  0.775  0.028 
Raising student reading achievement  -0.018  0.783  0.056 
Role model for students  0.446  0.236  0.290 
Student satisfaction with teacher  0.967  0.008  0.046 
Positive relationship with colleagues  0.037  -0.034  0.872 
Positive relationship with administrators  0.055  -0.026  0.844 
Notes: Factors derived from ML factor analysis with a Promax rotation that excludes the parent satisfaction item.  






TABLE IV  
BASELINE ESTIMATES OF PARENT REQUESTS 
  OLS Estimates   Structural 
Estimates 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
2-5 years of experience  0.077* 





6-10 years of experience  0.054* 





11-20 years of experience  0.085* 





21+ years experience  0.017 





First year in the school (with >1 
year of experience) 
-0.048* 





Male   0.012 





BA Degree at in state (but not 
local) college 
-0.006 





BA Degree at out of state 
college  
-0.020 





MA Degree  0.009 





Any additional endorsements   -0.008 





Mixed grade classroom   -0.067* 





Two teachers in the classroom  0.070* 





Dual language classroom  0.024 





Teacher value-added in reading 
and math     0.062 







Principal’s evaluation of the 
teacher’s ability to raise student      0.047* 






achievement (composite)  [0.020] 
Principal’s evaluation of the 
teacher’s ability to promote 
student satisfaction (composite)  









Principal’s evaluation of the 
teacher’s collegiality 
(composite) 







Number of observations  251  251  251  251  251  251  331 
Chi-square (p-value) of test of 
joint significance of grade fixed 
effects in the cost function 
            6.00 
(0.20) 
Chi-square (p-value) of test of 
joint significance of school fixed 
effects in the cost function 
            60.91 
(0.00) 
Notes:  Sample includes grades 2-6.  For columns 1-6, the unit of observation is the teacher-grade-school-year 
(n=251).  The dependent variable is the number of parent requests, normalized by subtracting off the average 
number of requests in the grade-school-year and then dividing by the student enrollment in the grade-school-year.  
All models include fixed effects for school-grade-year.  The fraction of parents requesting any teacher in the sample 
is 0.283 and the average fraction of parents requesting any individual teacher is 0.095.  Standard errors are clustered 
by teacher.  Column 7 presents estimates of the preference parameters from the structural model.  The parentheses 
contain standard errors that are estimated via a bootstrap and the square brackets contain the average marginal effect 
of the variable on each teacher’s share, which is roughly comparable to the OLS point estimates. * = significant at 5 
percent level.  † = significant at 10 percent level.  
 
  
  58 
TABLE V 
STRUCTURAL ESTIMATES OF DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF PARENT PREFERENCES BY FAMILY DEMOGRAPHICS  









Diff.  Minority  Non-









    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 


























                       







[0.571]  -0.072  -0.029 
[-0.295] 
0.056 
[0.484]  -0.085  -0.013 
[-0.104] 
0.085 
[0.759]  -0.098 


























                       







[-0.026]  0.055  0.079 
[0.796] 
0.004 
[0.038]  0.075  0.057 
[0.466] 
-0.004 
[-0.031]  0.061 
Notes:  Sample includes only grades 2-6 (n=331).  Demographics are measured at the school-grade-year level.  * = significant at 5 percent level.  † = significant 
at 10 percent level.  59 
TABLE VI 
STRUCTURAL ESTIMATES OF DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF PARENT PREFERENCES BY FAMILY DEMOGRAPHICS  









Diff.  Minority  Non-









    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 


























                       







[0.481]  -0.029  0.026 
[0.282] 
0.053 
[0.443]  -0.027  0.017 
[0.131] 
0.079 
[0.694]  -0.062 


























                       







[-1.269]  0.364  0.385 
[4.095] 
-0.101 
[-0.850]  0.486  0.010 
[0.076] 
-0.027 
[-0.235]  0.037 
Notes:  Sample includes only grades 2-6 (n=331).  Demographics are measured at the school-grade-year level.  * = significant at 5 percent level.  † = significant 
at 10 percent level.  
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 TABLE VII 
DOES THE LEVEL AND VARIATION IN TEACHER QUALITY MEASURES DIFFER ACROSS SCHOOLS?  
  Dependent Variables  
  Level of Teacher Characteristics  
Range of Teacher Characteristics  
Within Each Choice Set  
(i.e., school*grade*year) 













































R-squared  0.006  0.022  0.035  0.035  0.002  0.114  0.167  0.063 
F-stat (p-value) of joint significance of the 
regression that includes school fixed 

















Number of observations  198  202  202  202  80  79  79  79 
Notes: The unit of observation for columns 1-4 is a teacher-year.  The unit of observation for columns 5-8 is a school-grade-year.  The percent eligible for free-
lunch is the average for a grade-school-year.  Estimates are based on OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by school.  We do not include our baseline 
value-added measures because they include school fixed effects.  Instead we use a specification that does not include school fixed effects but does include student 
fixed effects to address concerns regarding unobserved heterogeneity across schools.  * = significant at 5 percent level.  † = significant at 10 percent level.  
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Table VIII  
ARE REQUESTING PARENTS SIMILAR TO NON-REQUESTING PARENTS? 
    School 116  School 122 




All Students  Students who 
made requests 
           
% eligible for free lunch  0.48  0.66  0.38  0.29  0.09 
% minority   0.27  0.44  0.24  0.15  0.06 
% Hispanic  0.21  0.36  0.15  0.06  0.01 
% other minority  0.06  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.05 
% limited English 
proficient  0.21  0.37  0.20  0.10  0.02 
% special education  0.12  0.13  0.06  0.12  0.11 
           
Number of observations  5783  391  68  461  141 
Percent of parents who 
made a request    0.17    0.31   
Notes:  Sample includes all students from school 116 in 2003-04 and school 122 in 2004-05. 
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TABLE IX 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES  
 






  Eligible for 
Free Lunch 
Not eligible 




for free lunch 
Baseline 
Cost function includes grade and school fixed 
effects.  Preference function includes only 
principal-based student satisfaction and student 









Alternative Specifications of the Cost Function         
















Alternative Specification of the Preference 
Parameters 
       










Includes measures of experience and experience 
squared along with dummy variables for male 










Alternative Measure of Parent Requests         








Alternative Principal Measures          
Using principal-reported measures of a teacher’s 
ability to promote student satisfaction and raise 
student achievement that are by construction 










Alternative Assumption Regarding Value of Not 
Making a Request         
Expected teacher quality if no request is made 
takes into account that the probability of being 
assigned to a classroom depends on the 









Notes:  Sample includes only grades 2-6 (n=331).  Demographics are measured at the school-grade-year level.  * = 
significant at 5 percent level.  † = significant at 10 percent level.  
 